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Although downbursts have been identified as the major cause of a number of aircraft takeoff and
landing accidents, only the 1985 Dallas/Fort Worth (I)FW) and the more recent (July 1994) Charlotte,
North Carolina, landing accidents provided sufficient onboard recorded data to perform a comprehensive
analysis of the downburst phenomenon. The first step in the present analysis was the determination of
the downburst wind components. Once the wind components and their gradients were determined, the
degrading effect of the wind environment on the airplane's performance was calculated. This wind-shear-
induced aircraft performance degradation, sometimes called the F-factor, was broken down into two
components F_ and F2, representing the effect of the horizontal wind gradient and the vertical wind
velocity, respectively. In both the DFW and Charlotte cases, F_ was found to be the dominant causal
factor of the accident. Next, the aircraft in the two cases were mathematically modeled using the longi-
tudinal equations of motion and the appropriate aerodynamic parameters. Based on the aircraft model
and the determined winds, the aircraft response to the recorded pilot inputs showed good agreement with
the onboard recordings. Finally, various landing abort strategies were studied. It was concluded that the
most acceptable landing abort strategy from both an analytical and pilot's standpoint was to hold constant
nose-up pitch attitude while operating at maximum engine thrust.
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Nomenclature
= body-axis accelerations
= lift, drag coefficients
= stability derivative
= pitching moment coefficient
= side-force coefficient
= drag
= F-factor and its components
= geometric and energy altitude
= moment of inertia about y axis
= pitch rate
= thrust
= body-axis velocity components
= true airspeed vector
= wind velocity vector
= north, east, and upward wind vector
components
= horizontal tailwind
= aircraft position (Earth frame)
= angle of attack, vane angle
= side-slip angle
= air mass flight-path angle
= flap deflection angle
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6H = stabilizer deflection angle
_'w = wind-axis heading angle
_b, 0, _b = body-axis Euler angles
I. Introduction
IND shear has been a major cause of aircraft accidentsthroughout aviation history. In the U.S., between 1964
and 1985, wind shear has contributed to at least 26 civil ac-
cidents involving more than 500 fatalities.' In the five years
following 1986, airline pilots have reported 96 severe turbu-
lence incidents, 2 some of them involving downbursts.
Two common types of airplane encounters with wind shear
are turbulence encounters at high cruising altitudes and down-
burst penetrations during takeoff and landing. Downbursts oc-
cur near the ground beneath storm cells and may be accom-
panied by heavy rain (wet downbursts) or in some cases, if
the atmosphere is very dry, may occur in the virga beneath the
storm cell (dry downbursts)) Downbursts can also be classified
as microbursts or macrobursts according to the diameter of the
outburst winds) Since the first recognized downburst accident
in 1956, there have been at least eight other major encounters.
A tabulation of downburst accidents/incidents is shown in Ta-
ble 1.
Previously, in cases of clear air turbulence incidents, data
from the onboard Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) have
been used in conjunction with ground-based radar tracking
(ATC radar) to extract the components of the turbulent
winds. 4-6 Bach and Wingrove 6 provided the wind estimations
used in the preliminary investigation of the Delta L-10tl ac-
cident that occurred during landing at the Dallas/Fort Worth
airport. Fujita 7 performed DFW downburst studies. As previ-
ously mentioned, only two of the nine downburst accidents
listed in Table 1 involved airplanes equipped with DFDRs, i.e.,
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Table 1 History of downburst accidents
Takeoff/ Fatality/
Location Date Airplane landing passenger
Kano, Nigeria June 24, 1956 Boac Arogaut Takeoff 32/45
Pago Pago, Somoa January 30, 1974 Pan Am 806 Landing 96/101
JFK, New York June 24, 1975 B-727 (Eastern 66) Landing 112/124
Denver August 7, 1975 Continental 426 Takeoff 0/134
Doha, Qatar May 14, 1976 Royal Jordian 600 Landing 45/64
Philadelphia, PA June 23, 1976 Allegheny 121 Takeoff 0/106
New Orleans, LA July 9, 1982 B-727 (Pan Am 759) Takeoff 152/161
Dallas Fort Worth, TX August 2, 1985 L-1011 Landing 137/163
Charlotte, NC July 2, 1994 DC-9 Landing 37/57
the DFW L-1011 landing accident in 1985 and the 1994 Char-
lotte, North Carolina DC-9 accident that occurred during an
attempted landing abort. Thus, the lack of an adequate data-
base restricted the present analysis to these two accidents.
This article analyzes in detail the two previously mentioned
encounters. Wind components in both cases were estimated.
The degradation of the aircraft's climb capability and ability
to maintain airspeed, sometimes called the F-factor, was cal-
culated and discussed. Also, flight simulations were performed
to validate the aerodynamic model and to examine various
landing abort strategies.
IL Wind Estimation Methods
Before the introduction of the flight data recorder (FDR) and
the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), aviation accident investi-
gators had to rely on examination of the wreckage, meteoro-
logical data, and interviews of survivors and eyewitnesses.
This method left a lot of questions unanswered. The early
FDRs recorded only four channels of data: 1) indicated air-
speed, 2) vertical acceleration, 3) pressure altitude, and 4)
magnetic heading, along with radio transmission times. Al-
though an improvement in the investigation of the wind-shear-
related accidents, the information provided was so sparse that
investigators were unable to reconstruct, with any precision,
the wind environment surrounding the accident (e.g., Eastern
Airlines F1-66, John F. Kennedy Airport, New York, and Pan
Am F1-759, New Orleans, Louisiana).
Digital flight data recorders were made mandatory on all
large airliners certified after 1969. The extensive set of varia-
bles recorded on the DFDR along with ATC radar tracking
data now provided a sufficient data set to accurately recon-
struct the wind environment experienced by the airplane. 4'5
The wind vector W is defined as
w = v, - v (1)
where V, is the aircraft velocity in an Earth-fixed frame, and
V is the vector of the true airspeed relative to the moving air
mass (Fig. 1). The three components of W are given by the
following equations:
W_ = _ - V cos q*w cos % (2)
W_. = y - V sin t/,w cos % (3)
Wh = h -- V sin 3', (4)
where %, the air mass flight path angle, and _Ow,the wind axis
heading angle, are calculated from the following equations4:
sin % = cos a cos/3 sin 0 - C cos 0 (5)
sin/3 cos 4, - sin a cos/3 sin 05
tan(tPw- q,)= (6)
cos a cos /3 cos 0 + Csin0
a)
Xl
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///Z
Yw
b)
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The angle 13 is calculated using the following equation:
/3 = (1/C:Q(a:.C,,. - Cy, &) (8)
where Cw is the weight coefficient, C,., and C,,_ are side-force
derivatives, and 6r is the rudder-deflection an_le.
The velocity components in an Earth-fixed coordinate sys-
tem may be calculated, using the following equationsS:
= a. cos 0 cos tp + a,.(sin 05 sin 0 sin _0 - cos 05 sin tp)
+ atcos 05 sin 0 cos qJ + sin 4, sin O) (9)
y = a_ cos 0 sin _0 + a;.(sin 4' sin 0 sin _ + cos 4, cos _)
+ aicos 05 sin 0 sin _0 - sin 05 cos tp) (10)
C = sin a cos/3 cos 05 + sin/3 sin 4' (7) /4 = a,. sin 0 -- (a:. sin 4, + a: cos 05)cos 0 -- 1 (11)
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These equations are integrated successively to provide the in-
ertial velocities ._, _, and/i and the inertial positions x, y, and
h. Biases and initial conditions are determined by matching the
calculated ground positions to ATC radar tracking data and the
calculated altitude to the DFDR recorded barometric alti-
tude. 4-6
There are two methods of determining the angle of attack.
In the DFW case, a direct measurement of the angle of attack
was made with a vane. In this case, with a flap setting of 33
deg, the true o_ is given by the calibration equation:
a = 0.535av,,o + 3.72 deg (12)
In the Charlotte case, where no direct measurement of the an-
gle of attack was made, the angle of attack was determined
from the lift curve (i.e.. CL vs a) at the specified flap setting
using the following equations:
nzw = -az cos ot + ax sin ot (13)
Cz. = nzwW/qS = nzwC,,. (14)
a = (CL/CJ + ao (15)
where nzw is the wind-axis vertical load factor. In this case,
when the pilot decided to abort the landing, the flaps of the
DC-9 were retracted from 40 to 15 deg. In performing the
calculation of a. since no recording of flap deflection was
available, it was assumed that the flap retraction was started
15 s before ground impact and that the flap deflection de-
creased at a constant rate from 40 to 15 deg over a period of
lls.
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III. Derived Winds
Vector plots of the wind components for the DFW case are
shown in Figs. 2 and 3 in both plan and elevation views. The
Charlotte wind vectors are displayed in Figs. 4 and 5. As ob-
served, during downburst encounters, the airplane, as it enters
the downburst, first encounters strong headwinds that rapidly
change into tailwinds. All the while, during the downburst pen-
etration, the aircraft is subjected to downdrafts of variable in-
tensity.
Entrained vortices are sometimes observed in downbursts.
They occur near the ground in the outflow along the perimeter
of the vertical column of the downburst. The vortices, de-
pending on their strength, can be very damaging to the air-
craft's performance. These entrained vortices can be seen in
both the DFW and Charlotte cases. In the DFW case the vortex
was sufficiently strong to cause the airplane to reach a stalling
angle of attack as it exited the vortex. This vortex was en-
countered about 16 s before ground impact and was possibly
the major cause of the accident. After the vortex encounter the
airplane never recaptured the glide slope or regained a suitable
nose-up pitch attitude. In the Charlotte case, as shown in Figs.
4 and 5, the vortex was much smaller and less intense and
played a minor role in the accident.
IV. Performance Degradation, F-Factor
The damaging effect of a downburst is based on the fact
that when the aircraft enters a downburst it first gains airspeed
as a result of the increasing headwind. This may prompt the
pilot to intuitively decrease power. A few seconds later, the
headwind decreases as the aircraft penetrates deeper into the
downburst. As the airplane exits the core of the downburst, it
is being pushed downward by strong vertical winds that are
accompanied by large increases in tailwind. This sudden loss
of airspeed and altitude places the aircraft in a precarious po-
sition with respect to maintaining the glide slope and a suitable
flying speed.
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To quantitatively analyze the aircraft performance capability,
a quantity, h., called herein the energy height and defined as
the total energy per unit weight, was used. Thus,
he = h + (V2/2g) (16)
where h is a measure of the potential energy and V2/2g rep-
resents the kinetic energy (V is the airspeed). The rate of the
increase in total energy when subjected to horizontal and ver-
tical winds, Wx and Wh is 9
which, in dimensionless form becomes
(18)
where W is the airplane's weight.
[(Wx/g) - (Wh/V)] is a measure of the degradation of the
aircraft performance capability, and is sometimes called the F-
factor.' Thus,
F = (W,./V) - (whir) (19)
The F-factor may be broken down into components Fj and F2,
representing the effect of the changing headwinds and the
downdrafts, respectively. Thus,
F, = Wflg (20)
F2 = -(Wh/V) (21)
From the definition, it can be seen that the larger F becomes,
the more restricted the airplane's climb performance will be-
come. When the F-factor exceeds a certain value [e.g., F >
(T - D)/W] over a certain finite time span, the airplane will
be unable to maintain the energy level necessary to safely com-
plete the landing or takeoff operation. The F-factor and its
components for the two cases were calculated and are shown
in Figs. 6-9. As one of the most severe downbursts ever doc-
umented, the DFW case had an F-factor reaching a value ap-
proaching 1.0 while traversing the core of entrained vortex. In
the Charlotte case the downburst in terms of the F-factor is
shown to be relatively less intense. It can be seen that, in both
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cases, Fl is significantly larger than F2, indicating that the hor-
izontal wind gradient was the dominant cause of the accidents.
V. Landing Abort Strategies
Various landing abort strategies were examined for both the
DFW and Charlotte accidents. A three-degree-of-freedom lon-
gitudinal aerodynamic model was devised. The model was first
validated by comparing the airplane's response to the winds
and the recorded control inputs with the DFDR recorded out-
puts. The comparison showed good agreement.
A. Flight Simulation
The simulation assumed an Earth-based inertial frame and
the aircraft as a rigid body. The linearized longitudinal equa-
tions of the airplane are s
(] = (I/m)X - g sin 0 - qW (22)
W = (1/m)Z + g cos 0 + qU (23)
4 =M/L_. (24)
Fig. 6 DFW F-factor. 0 = q (25)
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C., = C.,o + C,.a + C,,,.(_ + _g) + Cm_S. + C.,_Se (32)
a=tan -_ W+ Wxsin 0 + Wj, cos 0
U+ Wxcos 0- Whsin 0
(33)
dW,, Wh
(34)
qg =-dx - Vx
= _pV _ (35)
V=[(W+ Wxsin 0+ Whcos 0) 2
+ (U + W_ cos 0 - Wh sin 0)z] In (36)
Starting with the correct initial conditions, integration of the
previous equations forward in time using the pilot's inputs as
recorded on the DFDR, yields the state variables from which
the flight path may be obtained. The simulated and recorded
flight path and other variables such as airspeed, pitch attitude,
and angle of attack were compared. The little discrepancy ver-
ified the accuracy of the simulation model.
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IAS in 12-deg pitch hold landing abort (DFW).
where U and W are ground referenced inertial velocity com-
ponents along the body axis, and 0 and q are the pitch attitude
and pitch rate in the Earth-fixed frame. After substituting CL,
Co, and C,,, into the expanded form of X, Z, and M, the sim-
ulation model for the airplane is as follows_°:
0 = (1/m)[(CL sin a -- Co cos _)_1S + Xr] - g sin 0 - qW
(26)
W = ( - llm)[(Ct, cos ot - Co sin a)glS + Zr] + g COS 0 + qU
(27)
(1 = (C.,gtSg + Mr)H,:,. (28)
0 = q (29)
where, considering the gust effect on c_, q, and airspeed, V, 9
CL = CL_(_ -- O_o)+ CL_S. .... + CL.(c_ + c_) + CL=& (30)
Co = Coo + kC_. + Co_ BH.... (31)
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Fig. 12 Altitude in 12-deg pitch hold landing abort (Charlotte).
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B. Previous Studies
Previous studies of landing abort strategies have been made.
Some of these studies have used potential flow to represent
the downburst winds." Such potential flow models would, for
example, poorly represent the DFW downburst where the en-
trained vortices, which were not included in the model, were
a major contributor to the accident. In 1987, Bryson and Zhao
proposed a control strategy that allowed satisfactory penetra-
tion of a Boeing 727 through a severe downburst during take-
off. 12The strategy used a combination of tight climb-rate hold
feedback and full throttle. They used with success Boeing's
recommendation for the B-727 of holding a constant pitch at-
titude of 0 = 15 deg while traversing the downburst.
C. Pitch-Hold Landing Abort
In this article, several landing abort strategies were studied
for the two downburst encounters. The wind inputs were those
of the derived winds that included the entrained vortices. It
was assumed that during the landing abort the winds were
those affecting the accident airplane. Usually the abort altitude,
at a given time, would be greater than that of the accident
aircraft for which the winds were known. Consequently, since
the horizontal wind gradients decrease with altitude, the pres-
ent landing abort studies would, in general, be conservative
with respect to the degrading effects of the downburst winds.
With respect to the landing abort strategies studied, it was
concluded that the most acceptable strategy was to apply max-
imum thrust and hold constant pitch attitude during the abort.
For both the DFW and Charlotte cases a pitch hold of 12 deg
appeared to be preferable to 15 deg, the preference being based
on the margin of airspeed above the stall.
Figures 10 and 11 show the altitude and airspeed during a
simulated landing abort of the L-1011. The abort was started
23 s before impact, with the application of full engine thrust
and a 12-deg pitch attitude hold. Figures 12 and 13 show the
results of a landing abort of the Charlotte DC-9. The pitch
attitude was held constant at 12 deg and throttle was set for
maximum climb thrust. The abort was started 23 s before ira-
pact. In both abort cases satisfactory altitude and airspeed were
maintained.
VI. Conclusions
The wind components along the flight path were first deter-
mined and when plotted in vector form displayed the salient
characteristics of a downburst. The aircraft, in both cases, upon
exiting the downbursts, encountered vortices entrained in the
outflow. In the DFW case the vortex was very intense and
became a major contributor to the accident.
To quantitatively measure the wind-induced performance
degradation, the F-factor and its two components, F_ and F2,
were calculated. When plotted in component form, it was
shown that, in both cases, Ft was much larger than F2. Con-
sequently, the rapid shift from a headwind to a tailwind, as
quantified by F], was the major contributor to the accidents.
Among the many simulations studied of landing aborts, it
was concluded that the most acceptable strategy was one of
holding constant pitch attitude while having the engines set at
maximum climb thrust.
Acknowledgments
This reasearch was made possible by the support of NASA
Ames Research Center through Cooperative Agreement NCC-
2-329. This support was greatly appreciated. Also, thanks are
extended to all the members of the NASA Ames Navigation
and Guidance Branch involved in this research.
References
_Bowles, R. L., and Targ, R.,"Windshear Detection and Avoidance:
Airborne System Perspective," Proceedings of the 16th Congress
of the International Council of the Aeronautical Sciences, 1988, pp.
7-20.
2Stack, D. T., "Turbulence Avoidance," Proceedings of the 4th
International Conference on Aviation Weather Systems, American Me-
teorology Society, Boston, MA, 1991, pp. 283-286.
3Fujita, T. T., "The Downburst: Microburst and Macroburst,'" Sat-
ellite and Mesometeorology Research Project, Research Paper 210,
Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, IL, 1985.
4parks, E. K., Bach, R. E., Jr., and Wingrove, R. C., "Analysis of
the Nature and Cause of Turbulence Upset Using Airline Flight Rec-
ords," Proceedings of the 13th Annual Symposium of the Society of
Flight Test Engineers (New York), Society of Flight Test Engineers,
Lancaster, CA, 1982, pp. 151-158.
SParks, E. K., Wingrove, R. C., Bach, R. E., Jr., and Mehta, R. S.,
"Identification of Vortex-Induced Clear Air Turbulence Using Airline
Flight Records," Journal of Aircraft, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1985, pp. 124-
129.
6Bach, R. E., and Wingrove, R. C., "The Analysis of Airplane
Plight Records for Winds and Performance with Application to the
Delta 191 Accident," Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conf., Aug.
t986.
7Fujita, T. T., "DFW Microburst,'" Univ. of Chicago, Satellite and
Mesometeorology Research Project (SMRP), Chicago, IL, 1986.
8Etkin, B., Dynamics of Flight, Wiley, New York, 1982.
9Shen, J., "An Analysis of Two Downburst Related Aircraft Ac-
cidents," M.S. Thesis, Univ. of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, 1995.
_°Aksteter, J. W., Parks, E. K., and Bach, R. E., Jr., "Parameter
Identification and Modeling of Longitudinal Aerodynamics," Journal
of Aircraft, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1995, pp. 726-731.
_;Zhu, S., "Fluid-Dynamic Model of a Downburst," Univ. of To-
ronto, UTIAS Rept. 271, Toronto, ON, Canada, 1983.
12Bryson, A., and Zhao, Y., "Feedback Control for Penetrating a
Downburst," AIAA Guidance and Control Conference (Monterey,
CA), AIAA, New York, 1987.
